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ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court would not be required to make any
"factual determination," it would simply clarify
the meaning of its own Decree of Divorce.
In part A(l) of her Argument, Ms. Hancock contends that

the issue raised in the bankruptcy court is identical to
that which Mr. Busch asked the trial court to address in the
case at bar.

Her explanation is that

"both the [bankruptcy court's] oral ruling and the
order [submitted to the bankruptcy court] indicate that
the identical issue was presented to both courts. In
order for the trial court to find that the second
mortgage was, in fact, in the nature of alimony, it
would by necessity, be forced to find that obligation
was not in the nature of support for the minor child.
This determination necessarily requires that the trial
court revisit the issue of whether the obligation was
in the nature of child support. Therefore, the trial
court would conduct the same factual determination that
had been previously conducted by the Bankruptcy
Court."1
Ms. Hancock is clearly mistaken.

In the first place,•

Mr. Busch is not asking the trial court to make any "factual
determination."

What he is asking the trial court to do is

to clarify the meaning of its own Decree of Divorce.

The

trial court has already made its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Mr. Busch is not asking for those to
be altered or amended in any way.

x

Brief of Appellee at page 12.

The Decree of Divorce,

however, orders Mr. Busch to pay the parties' second
mortgage.

It is beyond dispute that this obligation was

intended by the trial court to be either part of the
property division or an award of additional alimony.2

At

trial, Ms. Hancock presented evidence and argument that Mr.
Busch should be required to pay the second mortgage as
additional alimony.

There was no evidence or argument

presented which suggested that the second mortgage should be
treated as part of the property division.

All that Mr.

Busch is requesting is for the trial court to clarify its
intent to grant Ms. Hancock what she asked for.
Additionally, it is clearly not the case, as Ms.
Hancock contends, that in order for the trial court to find
that the second mortgage was intended to be additional
alimony "it would by necessity, be forced to find that
obligation was not in the nature of support for the minor
child."3

To the contrary, Mr. Busch's obligation to pay the

second mortgage can be additional alimony under the Decree

2

Ms. Hancock acknowledges that the trial court did not
intend for Mr. Busch's obligation to pay the second mortgage
to be additional child support: "...to call it child support
would not be truthful. It isn't child support." (R. 721 at
page 5, lines 26 thru 28)
3

Brief of Appellee at page 12.

of Divorce and still be "in the nature of child support" for
purposes of federal bankruptcy law.
Sampson,

See,

e.g.,

997 F.2d 717, 722 (10th Cir. 1993).

In
In

re

Sampson,

the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that
Congress, by directing federal courts to determine
whether an obligation is "actually in the nature of
alimony, maintenance, or support," sought to ensure
that section 523(a) (5)'s underlying policy is not
undermined either by the treatment of the obligation
under state law or by the label which the parties
attach to the obligation. Thus, a debtor's lack of
duty under state law to support his or her former
spouse does not control whether an obligation to the
former spouse is dischargeable in bankruptcy".
997 F.2d at 722 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, clarification by the trial court that Mr.
Busch's obligation to pay the second mortgage was intended
to be additional alimony would in no way be inconsistent
with the Bankruptcy Court's determination that it was in the
nature of child support for bankruptcy purposes.
II.

The proceedings before the Bankruptcy Court and those
before the trial court do not involve the same "bundle
of legal principles."
In part A(2) of her Brief, Ms. Busch repeats her

contention that collateral estoppel is applicable because
"the same factual determinations were before both courts."
As set forth above, Mr. Busch is not asking the trial court
to make any factual determinations; only to clarify whether

his obligation to pay the second mortgage was intended as
additional alimony, as was Ms. Hancock's position at trial,
or was intended to be part of the property division.
What Ms. Hancock fails to address is the fact that the
issue before the Bankruptcy Court required the application
of legal principles very different from those which would be
required of the trial court in the case at bar.
See

Accordingly, collateral estoppel has no bearing.
Commissioner

v.

Sunnen,

715 (1948); and State
Health,

333 U.S. 591, 92 L.Ed. 898, 68 S.Ct.
Ex Rel.

Flowers

260 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 1978); Cf.

v. Department
Rhoades

v.

of
Wright,

552 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1976) (a change in a governing
statute or rule of court deprives a judgment based on a
former statute or rule of its conclusiveness).
The Sunnen

case involved, inter alia, the Commissioner

of the Internal Revenue's appeal from the Tax Court's
decision applying res judicata to bar a challenge to the
taxpayer's and his wife's treatment of royalties from a
licensing contract which the taxpayer had assigned to his
wife.

In an earlier case between the same parties, the Tax

Court concluded that the taxpayer was not taxable on the
royalties paid to his wife during the years 1929-1931.

In

Sunnen,

the Tax Court applied "res judicata to bar a

different result as to the royalties paid pursuant to the
same agreement during 1937."

333 U.S. 596.

The Eighth

Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court's ruling and
United States Supreme Court reversed.

In doing so, the

Court found it "first necessary to understand something of
the recognized meaning and scope of res
of judicial origin."

333 U.S. 597.

judicata,

a doctrine

The collateral estoppel

branch of res judicata was explained in part as follows:
That principle is designed to prevent repetitious
lawsuits over matters which have once been decided and
which have remained substantially static, factually and
legally. It is not meant to create vested rights in
decisions that have become obsolete or erroneous with
time... It must be confined to situations where the
matter raised in the second suit is identical in all
respects with that decided in the first proceeding and
where the controlling facts and applicable legal rules
remain unchanged. If the legal matters determined in
the earlier case differ from those raised in the second
case, collateral estoppel has no bearing on the
situation .... the legal matter raised in the second
proceeding must involve the same set of events or
documents and the same bundle of legal principles that
contributed to the rendering of the first judgment.
333 U.S. at 599-602 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in State

Ex Rel.

Flowers

the Supreme Court

of Wisconsin rejected a collateral estoppel defense where
two separate proceeding involved the same facts, but
distinct "bundle[s] of legal principle[s]."

There, the

defendant had been convicted of an offense, imprisoned and
then paroled.

His parole was subsequently revoked based in

part on conduct arising out of an incident for which he had
been criminally charged and acquitted.

He appealed, arguing

that his acquittal of the criminal charges barred the use of
the conduct leading to the criminal charges in the
subsequent parole revocation hearing under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.
argument.

The Wisconsin court rejected this

Citing Sunnen,

supra,

the court concluded that

"[h]ere the ^bundle of legal principals' is not the same
because different burdens of proof apply [beyond a
reasonable doubt in the criminal case and preponderance of
the evidence in the parole revocation hearing], and the
paramount considerations are different."
see also Faigin

v.

Kelly,

260 N.W.2d at 734;

184 F.3d 67, 78 (1st Cir.

1999)(the mere presence of a modicum of factual commonality
does not establish the requisite identity of issues for
purposes of collateral estoppel).
In the case at bar, it is very clear that the "bundle
of legal principles" contributing to the Bankruptcy Court's
determination that Mr. Busch's obligation to pay the second
mortgage is in the nature of child support is very different

from that which the trial court would be required to
consider.

The issue before Bankruptcy Court was whether the

second mortgage was a debt in the nature of child support
entitled to priority treatment under 11 U.S.C. §1322(a)(2)
or dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5).

As set forth

above, determination of that issue is a matter of federal
bankruptcy law regardless of the nature of the obligation
under state law.

In re Sampson,

911 F.2d at 722.

In the

case at bar, however, the trial court would be concerned
with a distinct "bundle of legal principles," including the
child support guidelines set forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-457.14.

Even Ms. Hancock acknowledges that the "bundle of

legal principles" considered by the bankruptcy court was
different from that which Mr. Busch is asking the trial
court to consider:
THE COURT: ... how would you characterize [the nature
of Mr. Busch's obligation to pay the second mortgage]
then?
Mr. TYCKSEN: Your Honor, I believe if I were to try to
characterize it from what this court would normally do,
I couldn't do it because the, to call it child support
[as the bankruptcy court did] would not be truthful.
It isn't child support. To call it alimony would not
be truthful either as this court would normally do.
But in the application of Federal Law and Bankruptcy
Law in that court as it's been applied over there,
there are cases that say that if it has the effect of
providing support to the family, i.e., maintaining a

household with a dependent child and those kinds of
things which is what the court found over there, then
it is, in fact, [in the nature of child support and]
not dischargeable.
(R. 721 at page 5, line 21 thru page 6, line 8)
Accordingly, collateral estoppel is not applicable.
In part A(2)(b) of her Argument, Ms. Hancock also
points out that state and federal court's have concurrent
jurisdiction to determine issues of dischargeability under
11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5).

That is clearly the case.4

It is

also clearly irrelevant for purposes of Mr. Busch's appeal.
Mr. Busch has not raised any challenge to the Bankruptcy
Court's rulings, jurisdictional or otherwise.

To the

contrary, Mr. Busch believes that the Bankruptcy Court's
rulings were entirely appropriate as a matter of federal
bankruptcy law.

The Bankruptcy Court did not, however,

purport to rule on, or otherwise make any finding with
respect to, the intent of the trial court in the case at bar
when it ordered Mr. Busch's to pay the second mortgage.

At

the risk of redundancy, Mr. Busch's duty to pay the second
mortgage under state law had very little, if any, relevance
to the Bankruptcy Court's characterization of that

4

See, e.g.,
(Utah 1984).

Beckmann

v.

Beckmann,

685 P.2d 1045, 1049

obligation for purposes of bankruptcy law.
Sampson,

See,

e.g.,

In

re

997 F.2d at 772.

III. It was Ms. Hancock's burden to provide the trial court
with an adequate record of the proceedings before the
Bankruptcy Court.
In part B of her Brief, Ms. Hancock argues that Mr.
Busch "failed to present the trial court with an adequate
record of the bankruptcy proceedings'7 and, therefore, "this
court must ^assume the regularity' of the bankruptcy
proceedings and conclude that the Bankruptcy Court decision
was based on sufficient evidence regarding the nature of
[Mr. Busch's] obligations."5

Mr. Busch has two short

responses to this argument.

First, Mr. Busch has neither

challenged the "regularity" of the bankruptcy proceedings
nor the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
Bankruptcy Court's decision.

Second, collateral estoppel is

Ms. Hancock's affirmative defense.

Accordingly, it was her

burden, not Mr. Busch's, to provide the trial court with an
adequate record of the bankruptcy proceedings.
Maoris

& Associates

v.

Neways,

2000 UT 93, 520, 16 P.3d

1214, 1219.

5

See

Brief of Appellee at pages 19-21.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Busch respectfully requests
that the trial court's Orders denying his Motion for Order
Clarifying Nature of Obligation and his Objection to
Commissioner's Recommendation be reversed and that this case
be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this Court's decision.

lis
DATED this /j £. day of April, 2002

4jL

Scott B.VMitchell
ttorney for Appellant
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